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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONSCIENCE OF A CORPORATION
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BE-
HAVIOR. By Christopher D. Stone. Harper and Row. New York 1975.
Pp. xiii, 273. $12.95.
by Steven R. Hirschtick*
A corporation is not subject to the same moral responsibilities which
affect us all. As a separate entity, it feels no guilt for actions that would
universally be considered wrong, for example, the marketing of
a harmful drug following the suppression of test results indicating
that drug's potential effect. Moreover, the major corporations, which
are our "private governments," have been known to abuse their con-
centrations of wealth and power. Yet the United States Supreme Court
has declared that corporations are among the "persons" who are en-
titled to due process and equal protection benefits under the Constitu-
tion.' The evolution of our legal system based, in part, upon this status
for corporations has resulted in a scheme which does not recognize the
institutional peculiarities of a large corporate structure. However, cor-
porate abuses have led to many calls for a corporate social responsibil-
ity independent of, but supplementary to, the corporation's legal
responsibilities. Others, however, have concluded that the responsibil-
ity of corporations should be limited to obedience to the law.
In his new book, Where the Law Ends, Christopher D. Stone argues
that a lack of corporate social responsibility is insufficient. He attacks
the premise that if corporations are not acting responsibly, then correc-
tive legislation should be passed, as it would be in the case of any indi-
vidual. Furthermore, he also disagrees with the position that corpora-
tions should merely be required to comply with these laws; beyond the
laws, however, the corporations would be free to act. Stone's major
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premise is that the law is not working and we therefore need corporate
social responsibility, rather than the converse advanced by many that
corporate social responsibility is not workable and instead we need
more law. His work is not a vague call for social responsibility; it is
a non-technical treatise written logically and supported throughout by
case citations and illustrations. The first half of Stone's book is devoted
to a brief history of the development of corporate law in our society
and an analysis of why that law is not working to produce a more favor-
able result. The latter half contains his ideas for change, many of which
will seem to some, upon first reading, radical and unthinkable. In his
clear and logical style, Stone anticipates most of the criticism of his pro-
posals and presents a convincing position that his proposals are in fact
necessary and reasonable.
Stone's work begins with a discussion of the development of corpor-
ate law. The corporation cannot act as an individual; rather, it must
act through individuals acting on its behalf. Our early legal system was
geared to operating upon individuals, and it was not until the early 17th
century, when this system had already evolved, that corporations began
exerting their own identities as actors. With the industrial revolution,
there came a dramatic increase in the number of corporate charters
which were issued. State legislators developed flexible corporate codes
in furtherance of their "charter mongering," brought on in part by a
desire to increase state revenues by increasing the number of corpora-
tions chartered in a particular state: Broad judicial opinions inter-
preting already flexible corporate codes occurred at the same time that
the corporate structures were growing and becoming more complex.
Corporations were involved in the same activity as individuals, yet dis-
tinctions between the two types of actors existed. For example, a corpo-
ration could not be imprisoned for the same wrongful conduct which
would cause the imprisonment of an individual. Furthermore, the
shareholders of the corporation were protected from individual liability
in most cases by the so-called corporate veil of limited liability. In
short, the legal system did not and has not to an effective degree recog-
nized the institutional peculiarities of a corporation and has merely
brought the corporation into the system as a "person." Following this
brief account of corporate legal history, Stone asks the questions of what
do we want our law to accomplish and whether the current scheme is
achieving that goal.
Stone concludes that the primary functions of law are a distributive
function (of risks and losses) and a function of reducing certain harm-
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ful behavior. He divides this harmful behavior into absolutely harm-
ful, and therefore absolutely prohibited, and qualifiedly harmful, which
may be eliminated after a balancing of the benefits of elimination ver-
sus costs of elimination. The problem is, however, that the law is di-
rected to the effect of a wrongful act and not to the act's source, i.e., the
institutional weakness that led to the particular act. Why not apply the
law to subject key corporate individuals to criminal and civil sanctions?
The corporation itself certainly cannot be imprisoned. In theory, these
sanctions are available against the responsible individuals in the corpor-
ate structure; the difficulty is in determining the identity of these
individuals. Many of Stone's proposals consist of expanding and defin-
ing the informational net within the corporate structure, and therefore
ascertaining the identity of the individuals directly responsible for the
acts of the corporation.
In Stone's opinion, there are other reasons why the law is not
working. Many of the current sanctions imposed for wrongful corpor-
ate conduct are based upon a "rational economic person" concept-the
corporation is based upon profit maximization and therefore penalties
which are directed to the corporation's pocketbook will produce the
desired conduct. Stone challenges this concept and argues that factors
other than profits, e.g., prestige, are at work in the institutional struc-
ture. Furthermore, the law is only a small part of the whole range of
marketplace considerations affecting the corporate decision-making
process, and is not a substantial part of a corporate subsystem's
(individual profit center) reality. Yet it is this subsystem that is
responsible for initiating or facilitating many of the actions for which
the corporation is eventually faulted. For example, an individual profit
center, defining success on its level and not the corporate level, may
not transmit negative information up the ladder to higher level decision-
makers for a variety of reasons, including a desire to protect superiors
or avoid displeasing them. The law, however, focuses on the corpor-
ate level and not on each of the subunits.
Another reason cited by Stone for the law's failure to accomplish the
desired result is the separation of management and ownership in large
corporations. The shareholders are usually a diffuse group, and in
most cases have acquired their interests over a stock exchange rather
than by direct investment in the corporation. When a fine is imposed
upon such a corporation, it affects the corporation, but does not directly
affect the management which was responsible for the decision. Stone
was not aware of any evidence pointing to an ouster of management
[Vol. 9
BOOK REVIEW
because of such situations.2  In smaller (close) corporations, the deci-
sion is one of noncompliance versus cost of compliance, but the share-
holders, whose identity is closer to management in a close corporation,
are protected by the corporate shield of liability.
One arguably possible solution would be to increase the fines for cer-
tain disfavored conduct. Stone's reaction to this suggestion is:
I do not mean to suggest that the shift to bad-bargain strategy
[increasing penalties and fines] in selected areas is not possible, or even
likely. But there is, I think something of a theorem we must recognize,
that our counter-organizational measures will always be skewed toward
fair-bargain strategy and away from bad-bargain strategy, more so in the
case of a corporation than of the human being. That is, we will incline
to make the punishment "fit the crime" in the sense of collecting dam-
ages, or depriving the corporation of its unjust enrichment-its ill-
got gains-rather than make it "fit the crime" in the more severe sense
of making the action a dreaded risk in the future.
Thus, the overall picture is that our strategies aimed to control corpora-
tions by threatening their profits are a very limited way of bringing
about the internal changes that are necessary if the policies behind the
law are to be effectuated.8
Further, Stone concludes that measures aimed at individual wrong-
doers are also not working for a variety of reasons. Plaintiffs aim for
the deep pockets of the corporation rather than the individuals, and
even when there is an attempt to impose sanctions against the individ-
uals, a plaintiff or prosecutor is confronted with the requirement of
demonstrating that individual's responsibility. This is no easy hurdle
to overcome given the screening process of bad news that occurs within
the corporate structure and the court's willingness to allow ignorance
to insulate corporate management. Furthermore, in many cases where
liability could be successfully imposed upon responsible individuals, the
existence of liability insurance or indemnification by the corporation
will reduce the impact of the sanction.4 In Stone's words:
2. Such evidence is indeed scarce and difficult to find, but see Morality Play: Gulf
Officers' Ouster was Boldly Engineered by Mellon Interests, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 15,
1976, at 1.
3. C. STONE, Wnmm THE LAW ENDS: TIE SOCML CONTROL OF CoitoRATo BEHAVIOR,
57 (1975) [hereinafter cited as C. STONE].
4. California has in fact just liberalized (from management's point of view) its officer
and director indemnification provision. Law of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, § 7, If 317,
[1975] Cal. Stat. - (effective January 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GEN'L CORP.
IAW]. Amendments have been made to the General Corporation Law prior to its
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In any social grouping, it is doubtful how effective legal threats can be
as an instrument of social change, especially when the behavior to be
changed has "customary" support within the group, involves means con-
doned (or at least not strongly condemned) by the larger community,
and does not result in injuries that the individual actors can clearly and
vividly connect with their own behavior.5
Having concluded that the law is not working, Stone does not imme-
diately proceed with his suggested solutions; rather, he challenges those
who have argued that corporations' sole obligations relate to their
agreements with their shareholders regarding the maximization of
profits. Stone acknowledges that the anti-responsibility arguments are
based upon the corporations' alleged inability to be equipped for any-
thing other than operating by the dictates of the marketplace within the
constraints of law. He asks why shouldn't corporations be responsible
and interprets the promise to shareholders regarding profits not to mean
profits "in every way possible" without regard to any moral framework.
Stone faults the "anti's" not for their position, but for not pursuing the
alternatives. For a number of reasons, including the consumer's ignor-
ance of injury and ignorance of any power to correct a wrong which
is perceived, the marketplace is not the appropriate forum for correct-
ing the existing wrongs. Furthermore, the law as currently structured
is not doing the job, and probably cannot be restructured in a manner
which would be effective without changing the thrust of the current sys-
tem, insofar as the current system fails to draw a distinction between the
the "morality of duty and the morality of aspiration." That distinction is
that the law may prohibit certain conduct, but it cannot penalize an
individual for failing to work to his greatest potential.
There is, of course, as Stone recognizes, the problem of defining
responsibility. It is easy to say that a corporation must act responsibly,
but it is considerably more difficult to decide what that responsibility
shall mean. Does it mean merely that corporations should adhere to
the applicable codes, or does it mean that a corporation should act only
after it has thoroughly reflected upon its capacity for choice and the
impact of its actions? The former definition is the one currently in
vogue in the corporation codes, and, by this point in his book, Stone
has already concluded that this concept is not working. Most of his
effective date by the enactment of A.B. 2849, Reg. Sess. (1975-76), Law of Aug. 27,
1976, ch. 641, [1975] Cal. Stat. - [hereinafter cited as Technical Amendments Bill].
Amendments will be reflected in this review.
5. C. STONs, supra note 3, at 67.
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proposals are based upon the latter definition of responsibility and a
focus upon the corporations' decision-making process. In short, he is
focusing more upon how the corporation does what it does rather than
upon the end result of the decision-making process. It is his belief that
the redesigning of the decision-making process will achieve the desired
result with respect to the corporation's actions.
Not all of Stone's proposals are improvements on (or intrusions into,
depending upon your outlook) the corporations' decision-making proc-
ess. The first element of his all-encompassing proposals is a reforma-
tion of the Board of Directors. This element is founded upon the
proposition that there are certain issues relating to corporate conduct
(e.g., the marketing of a drug with grievous side effects) upon which
the public and a cross-section of informed business persons would not
disagree. He then proposes a board structure which should eliminate
wrongful conduct regarding these issues. Specifically, he proposes the
elimination of inside directors and the increase in the number of finan-
cially disinterested directors on the board. Furthermore, the board's
specific functions should be detailed and standards for directors' liabil-
ity should be set forth. Part of the proposal includes increasing the
information flow to the directors and their newly created staffs and
thereby making it easier to trace responsibility within the organization.
The foregoing is by no means the full extent of Stone's proposals.
He further suggests that the largest corporations must include general
public directors on their boards. These directors would be appointed
by a newly created Federal Corporations Commission, and the number
of any such general public directors would be determined by the sales
or assets of the corporation. Stone's proposal would only include the
largest corporations (262 companies based upon Fortune's 1973 list-
ings). The general public directors would work half-time with the as-
sistance of a staff, and would have nine primary functions which would
include acting as a super-ego of the corporation, checking on compli-
ance with the law, and providing a hot line for any "whistle-blower"
who perceived a problem within the corporation.
If one accepts all of Stone's premises and arguments to this point,
then the general public directorships would logically follow. The only
fault that can be found with this concept is the scope and magnitude
of what the general public directors are being asked to accomplish.
Stone recognizes this and states:
When one gets right down to it, if the only virtue of -the general public
directorship system was the symbolic one-a more obtrusive, nagging
1976]
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reminder of these companies' obligations to society than the American
flag over their plants-the system would, to my mind, have justified
itself.6
The general public directors would not be expected to discharge al of
their functions or work in highly critical areas of their corporation. Nor
would the general public directors be available for smaller corporations
who were also having difficulties in interacting with their environment.
To remedy these situations, Stone proposes special public directors.
These special directors would be appointed by courts or agencies to
work in critical areas of social concern for corporations which have
demonstrated their delinquency through repeated violations or for cor-
porations in an industry which was suffering a problem (e.g., the health
of workers in the asbestos industry). This concept is not as foreign
as it may at first sound. Provisions already exist for court appointed
special directors in certain problem situations.7  These problem situa-
tions, however, relate only to the shareholder-corporation relationship
and not to the corporation's relationship with its environment. Stone
further supports his special public director concept by a discussion of
cases in which courts have done almost the same thing under a different
label.
Stone's suggested reforms go well beyond the board level. Noting
that "only men admitted to the Bar can appear for a corporation in
court, but anyone it [the corporation] chooses can evaluate its labora-
tory data,"8 Stone proposes the creation of certain specific offices (e.g.,
a vice-president for environmental affairs of a company operating in
a heavily polluting industry). Stone further states:
Once the law establishes job definitions for critical offices, then liabili-
ties should be attached for the inadequate performance of those
functions. The point is central to the theme of this entire book: As
corporations increase in size, and production processes become more
complex, and more and more persons (and machines) have a hand in
the finished product, it is increasingly difficult to locate responsibility on
any one particular individual for that end product: the defective car
or the building that collapses. But if we make a system of punishments
task-oriented (in addition to our product-oriented punishments), it is
much easier to locate responsibility-on the person who failed to per-
6. Id. at 174.
7. A provisional director may be appointed by the court to break a board deadlock.
CAL. CoR. CODE ANN. § 819 (West 1955), continued without change in GEN'L. CORP.
IAw, supra note 4, § 308, as amended, Technical Amendments Bill, supra note 4, § 9.
8. C. STONE, supra note 3, at 193.
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form the critical task-and thus to head off problems before they
occur.
9
The most innovative (or most intrusive) of Stone's proposals consists
of sensitizing the corporation to the impact of its actions. The corpora-
t3n's informational net should be amended and reconstructed to pro-
vide a more complete gathering of information from the environ-
ment. Rather than the creation of firm rules by governmental agencies
and the confrontations which ofttimes follow, Stone proposes that spe-
cific decision-making persons should be designated within the corporate
structure and that these individuals should be responsible for the pre-
paration of impact reports. The corporation should be required to
receive information through hearings and other means and, based upon
this information, to prepare an impact study for all of its significant
actions, similar to the environmental impact reports which are already
required. The benefits of such a procedure are that the corporation
is formally required to justify its actions and thereby required to devote
significant thought to those actions. The corporation may sometimes
come up with the wrong answer, but at least it will be asking the right
questions. Moreover, the anonymity by which responsibility is often
avoided under our current rules would be removed.
With respect to all of his proposals, Stone recognizes that so long as
the underlying attitudes of the current corporate culture continue to
exist, then the effectiveness of his suggestions will be reduced. To
remedy this, he suggests certain proposals (e.g., in-house education
programs and social audits, among others) as attempts to alter these
attitudes.
Stone does not discuss the governmental level upon which his pro-
posals should be implemented. These proposals, at least those requir-
ing governmental action, if implemented on a state level would result
in the same type of forum shopping by corporations and charter-mon-
gering by some states which Stone initially faulted. This result could
be avoided by requiring compliance with a state's corporations code for
all corporations, domestic or foreign, which were transacting business
within that state. This is the approach taken in the new California
General Corporation Law.10 The other solution would be the creation
9. Id. at 190.
10. Gi'iL CoRp. LAw, supra note 4, §§ 2100-16, as amended, Technical Amendments
Bill, supra note 4, §§ 30.2-.32
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ofa federal corporations code, a proposal currently being advanced."'
Professor Stone's work constitutes a complete and well thought-out
blueprint for corporate reform. Credibility is lent to each of his sug-
gestions by his willingness to admit and discuss possible shortcom-
ings. His suggestions are based upon recognition of a corporation's
organizational attributes and interaction with corporations on that basis.
These proposals and his concepts of social responsibility will no doubt
become integral parts of any future discussions of this topic. His pro-
posals represent concrete suggestions in an area where it has always
been easier to state the problems than to suggest workable solutions.
In sum, whether one views his proposals as innovative solutions to exist-
ing problems or unthinkable intrusions into the corporate structure, his
book will provide an education and much food for thought on the topic.
11. See, e.g., Cam, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus.
LAWYER 1101 (1974).
